Immigration and the Informal Labor Market by Farré, Lídia & Bosch, Mariano
Immigration and the Informal Labor Market*

Lídia Farré
Universitat de Barcelona and IAE-CSIC
Mariano Bosch
Interamerican Development Bank
Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between immigration and the size of the informal or 
underground economy. Exploiting the variation across Spanish provinces we find that the massive 
immigration wave between 2000 and 2009 is highly correlated to the share of unregistered employment, 
a proxy for the size of the underground or informal labor market. We estimate that a 10 percentage 
points increase in the share of immigrants in a province generates between a 3 and 8 percentage points 
increase in unregistered employment. We also find that the controversial regularization of illegal aliens 
conducted in 2005 substantially reduced the number of illegal workers but did not affect the relationship 
between immigration and informality. In contrast, we do find that this relationship becomes stronger 
during the economic recession inaugurated in 2008.
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Resumen
Este  artículo analiza la relación entre inmigración y el tamaño de la economía sumergida. 
La explotación de los datos sobre la variación en las distintas provincias españolas, refleja que 
la ola de inmigración máxima habida en los años 2000-2009 está estrechamente relacionada con 
el tamaño del empleo no registrado, un buen indicador de la magnitud del mercado de trabajo 
sumergido. Se estima que un incremento de 10 puntos porcentuales en la tasa de inmigración en 
una provincia, genera un aumento entre 3 y 8 puntos porcentuales del empleo no registrado.  Por 
otra parte, se observa que la controvertida regularización de trabajadores ilegales llevada a cabo 
en 2005, redujo sustancialmente el número de estos trabajadores pero no afectó a la relación 
entre inmigración y mercado de trabajo sumergido. En cambio, se encuentra que esta relación se 
intensifica durante la recesión económica que comenzó en 2008.
Palabras clave: inmigración, economía sumergida, amnistía, recesión económica.
Clasificación JEL: J61, O17.
Introduction
The informal or underground economy is a widespread phenomenon, not only in 
developing countries but also in developed ones. In 2003 the size of the informal sec- 
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tor represented, on average, a 7% of the GPD in the oECD economies. In southern 
European countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain the informal sector accounted 
for up to a 30% of the GDP. The reasons for participating in the informal economy 
are highly debated in the literature (see Schneider and Enste, 2002), and range from 
pure tax evasion to a last resort activity in the face of high unemployment.
one of the main sources of the recent increase in informality in developed coun- 
tries is the massive inflows of undocumented immigrants from developing econo- 
mies attracted by job opportunities and the dream of a better life. Indeed, a large 
proportion of the foreign born labor force in most oECD countries are illegal or un- 
documented aliens (63.5% of all foreign residents in the US in 2007, 25.6% in Italy 
in 2005, 2.2% in the UK in 2005 or 3.4% in Spain in 2007). They are primary, 
individuals who entered the country surreptitiously over green or coastal borders; 
fraudulently by means of false documents; or legally through a temporary visa or 
permit (i.e. tourist or family-visit visas) followed by an overstay. They may also 
include asylum seekers who do not leave the hosting country if the application is 
denied2. Even if immigrants hold legal status they may be irregularly hired in the 
informal labor market, especially when underground activities are already common 
in the economy, as they are in southern Europe3.
This paper documents the relationship between immigration and the size of the 
informal labor market in Spain over the last decade. During this period the percenta- 
ge of the foreign born population shifted from 3% in 998 to 4% in 2009. Since the 
late 2000’s, the stock of immigrants has stabilized as a result of the severe economic 
and financial crisis that hit the country’s economy (see Figure 1).
The inflow of immigrants that arrived to Spain during the last decade represents 
one of the major migration waves in recent history and clearly reshaped the structure 
of the Spanish labor market (see for example González and ortega, 200). At the 
same time, the restrictive immigration policy and the weak border and work place 
enforcement stimulated the growth of illegal alien employment. In the attempt to 
draw immigrants out of the back economy the government conducted a series of 
amnesties. The most recent one in 2005 received 69,655 applications for regula- 
rization out of which 572,96 were approved4. In this paper we also investigate the 
effectiveness of this large and contested regularization process in decreasing the size 
of the informal labor market5.
 Estimates based on a number of different methodologies (oECD, 2009).
2 Estimates of the distribution of unauthorized immigrants by modalities for a number of countries 
suggest that overstay is the most common form of illegal immigration.
3 Among the oECD countries for the period 999-200, Greece, Italy and Spain had the largest 
shadow economies, at approximately 30% of GDP. In the middle group were the Scandinavian coun- 
tries and at the lower end were the United States, Austria and Switzerland at 0% of GDP (SChnEIDER and 
EnSTE, 2002).
4 Source: Ministry of Labor and Foreign Affairs.
5 In 2005 the size of the foreign born population according to the Registry data collected by the Spanish 
Satistics Office was 4,391,484..
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Research on this topic is scarce mainly due to the difficulty in measuring illegal 
immigrants and the size of the informal economy (Chiswick, 988). only a few 
developed countries such as the United States, Australia, Japan and Korea release 
regular statistics on this issue. our estimates of the contribution of immigration to 
the size of the informal labor market in Spain are based on comparisons between 
the official employment records of the Social Security and that in the Labor Force 
Survey. The first includes workers with a legal working contract while the second 
reflects the number of people legally or illegally engage in an economic activity. Our 
identification strategy exploits the cross-regional correlation in the difference bet- 
ween these two employment measures and the immigration inflow into each province 
over the last decade. We instrument the current distribution of immigrants across 
Spanish provinces using historical immigration settlements in the country (i.e. an 
instrument based on ethnic networks).
Our findings point to a strong relationship between immigration inflows in a pro- 
vince and the discrepancies between registered and total employment. In particular, 
a 0 percentage points increase in the share of immigrants in a province increases 
informal employment by 3 to 8 percentage points, depending on the specification. 
We also find that the 2005 amnesty which regularized hundreds of thousands im- 
migrants, while reduced the stock of illegal aliens, did not affect the relationship 
between immigration inflows and the size of the informal labor market.
The vibrant activity of the Spanish economy during the past decade was the main 
pull factor to drive up immigration. Between 2002 and 2007 the country received an 
impressive inflow of immigrants –approximately 500,000 per year– who were quick 
to find jobs, mainly in the booming construction and service sector. however, the 
international financial crisis of 2007 severely hit the country’s economy. One of the 
most negative consequences of the economic downturn was the dramatic increase in 
the unemployment rate, to levels above 25 per cent in 202. At the close of the paper 
we also investigate the implications of the economic recession for the estimated 
relationship between immigration and the size of the shadow economy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief description of 
the Spanish immigration history and its related policy. Section 3 contains a descrip- 
tion of the data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy, our results and robustness 
checks. Some concluding remarks follow.
2. Immigration to Spain
International migration to Spain has been on a rising trend since the mid-990s, 
with labor migration taking on a greater role since the early 2000s. The foreign born 
population jumped from ,73,767 in 998 to 6,466,278 in 2009. After this period, 
the stock of immigrants has remained almost constant as a result of the economic 
recession that hit the country (see Figure ). The yearly stock of immigrants is measu- 
red from the Registry data annually collected by each municipality. Immigrants have 
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strong incentives to register as this grants free access to the health and educational 
system. Registration also represents a valuable piece of evidence to prove residence 
in the country in the event of future amnesties. Thus the numbers obtained from the 
Registry provide an accurate estimate of the size of the foreign born population, 
including undocumented aliens.
The economic expansion of the last decade made of Spain a very attractive 
destination. Moroccans, for their geographical proximity, Latin Americans, given the 
small cultural gap and common language, and other Eastern European groups, mainly 
Rumanians, represented the bulk of immigrants over this period6. The construction 
boom attracted male low-skilled workers, whose spouses or relatives found jobs in 
the care giving and service sector7.
The scarcity of legal entry channels to fill low skilled jobs suggests that a 
substantial proportion of the foreign born population entered the country illegally 
or overstayed once their visa or temporary permission expired8. This conjecture is 
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evolutIon oF ImmIgratIon In SpaIn
noTE: Registry data (Padrón Municipal), Spanish Statistical Office. Absolute refers to the foreign born popu- 
lation in millions and Percentage refers to the percentage over the total population.
6 In 2009 Rumanians represented a .79% of the foreign born population, Moroccans .49%, 
Ecuadorians 7.4%, and Colombians a 5.55%.
7 See GonzáLEz and oRTEGA (200) and FARRé, GonzáLEz and oRTEGA (2009).
8 Prior to the 1970s, Spain was an emigrant country (Spaniards first emigrated to South and Central 
American and Africa and later to northern Europe). The first Spanish law to restrict immigration was 
passed in 985. The law required a job offer to apply for a work visa or residence permit. There have been
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supported by Figure 2 that compares the total number of foreign born recorded in 
the municipal Registry and those with a valid residence permit according to the data 
released by the Spanish Ministry of Labor and Foreign Affairs. The Figure indicates 
that the number of illegal aliens has shrunk over the second half of the last decade, 
particularly after the last regularization in 2005, however unregistered aliens still 
represent a 5% of the foreign born population in 2009.
FIgure 2
evolutIon oF documented and undocumented ImmIgratIon 
In SpaIn
8000000
7000000
6000000
5000000
4000000
3000000
2000000
1000000
0
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04 20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
 Total_foreigners              Legal
NOTE: Registry data (Padrón Municipal), Spanish Statistics Office (Spain) and Spain Ministry of Labor and 
Foreign Affairs, legal refers to foreigners with a valid residence permit Total foreigner velers to the total foreign 
population recorded in the Population Registry.
several amendments aimed at expanding the rights and opportunities of foreigners, but a job offer is still 
mandatory to obtain a work or residence permit. In 2002 the government established a system of annual 
quotas to hire foreign workers from their country of origin. In 2003 the quota was fixed at 24.337 workers and 
expanded to 27.034 in 2007. As a result of the economic recession the quota for permanent workers decreased 
by about 90% in 2009.
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Another estimate of the size of the unauthorized foreign born population at a 
particular point in time can be obtained from the results of the 3 consecutive amnesties 
conducted in Spain between 2000 and 2005. The first one in 2000 resulted in 153,463 
out of 247,598 applications being approved, mostly to citizens of Morocco, Ecuador, 
Colombia and China. After the first regularization the government implemented a 
number of legal reforms aimed at restricting labor inflows. The reforms not only 
were not effective in dissuading immigrants from arriving in record numbers, but 
also boosted undocumented labor since an employment contract was required to 
enter the country legally to work. In an attempt to control the inflow of immigrants 
who had entered the country without a contract and were hence working illegally, 
the government announced a second amnesty in 200. Approximately 350,000 
applications were received, and 22,083 permits were issued to citizens mainly from 
Ecuador, Colombia, Morocco and Romania. The immigration inflow did not stop 
and in 2005 Spain executed the largest regularization program to date. About seven 
hundred thousand workers from Ecuador, Romania, Morocco and elsewhere applied 
to regularize their immigration status. To qualify, they needed proof of residency in 
Spain since at least August 7, 2004, a work contract of at least six months’ duration, 
and no criminal records. About 83% of the applications received were approved. 
note that applications for regularization should be considered a lower bound for the 
presence of undocumented immigrants as the requirements already excluded from 
the process recent immigrants (less than a year), those with an illegal contract or 
involved in criminal activities.
Even when holding a legal status immigrants are frequently hired irregularly as it 
is a cheap and flexible alternative for employers to cover their labor needs. Among 
the main concerns raised by informal employment are: i) the weak social protection 
for the workers themselves; ii) the fact that informal employment is often a trap 
which offers few prospects to improve careers; iii) its consequences for workers in 
the formal economy, who suffer unfair competition and have to pay higher taxes than 
in the absence of informal employment; iv) potential rewarding of tax evasion and 
corruption associated with government inability to enforce the rule of law.
In what follows we investigate the contribution of immigration to the size of 
the informal labor market. We conduct a spatial correlation approach and exploit 
the variability in immigrant density and unregistered employment across Spanish 
provinces over the period 2000 to 2009. At the close of the paper we also extend 
the analysis to the period 200-202 to investigate the implication of the economic 
downturn for our finding. Crucial to our identification strategy are the important 
differences in the regional concentration of immigrants over the period. For example, 
the immigrant share, defined as the working age foreign born population over the 
total working age population, shifted from about 5% to more than 25% in regions 
along the Mediterranean coast, such as Murcia, Girona, and the Balearic Islands, 
while it remained below 5% over the all period in some Southern regions (Córdoba, 
Jaén y Badajoz).
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3. data
Gathering information about underground economic activity is difficult, because 
no one engaged in such activity wants to be identified. Disagreement persists about 
definitions and estimation procedures (see Schneider and Enste, 2002). Regarding 
its definition, the oECD (986) proposed to define “concealed employment” as 
“employment (in the sense of the current international guidelines on employment 
statistics) which, while not illegal in itself, has not been declared to one or more 
administrative authorities...“. The EU (998) similarly defines “undeclared work” 
as “any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to the 
public authorities, taking into account differences in the regulatory system of mem- 
ber States. Applying this definition, criminal activities would be excluded, as would 
work not covered by the usual regulatory framework and which does not have to be 
declared...”. We relay on the previous definitions of informal employment and use 
the data available in Spain to quantify the contribution of immigration inflows to the 
discrepancies between the employment recorded in the Spanish Labor Force Survey, 
LFS, (Encuesta de Población Activa, EPA) and the number of legal contracts in the 
Social Security records, SS.
The Labor Force Survey collects quarterly information on the employment 
status of the household members in Spain. In the survey a person is considered to 
be employed if he or she did some work for pay during the week previous to the 
interview. The survey does not distinguish between formal and informal employment. 
As those in an irregular employment situation have less incentives to declare their 
economic activities, the size of the informal labor market obtained from the Labor 
Force Survey should be considered a lower bound. There are other issues that are 
likely to affect the size of the informal economy calculated from the LFS. First, it 
does not collect information on individuals not living in households (i.e. living in 
pensions or hotels) which represent less than % of the population9. Second, it does 
not contain an accurate representation of temporary foreign workers as those do not 
have a residence in Spain. In 2005, however, the design of the LFS was modified to 
better capture the presence of the foreign born population. These corrections can be 
retrospectively applied to the LFS series from 996 to 2004, thus guaranteeing its 
continuity since 996.
The Social Security records contain information on all workers (employees and 
self-employed) with a legal employment contract. The information is published on 
a monthly basis and reflects the number of persons legally working as the last day 
of each month. There are some aspects of the Social Security records that should 
be considered when analyzing the discrepancies with the employment numbers 
in the Labor Force Survey. First, civil servants may choose to be affiliated to the 
Social Security system or to a private system. Those choosing the latter alternative 
do not appear in the Social Security records. Second, agriculture workers holding 
9 This estimation is provided by the Spanish Statistical Office.
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a temporary contract appear as employed in the Social Security records during the 
total length of the contract even if they do not work during the month of reference. 
Third, the members of the clergy are considered by the Social Security records as 
employed, and this is not the case in the Labor Force Survey. Fourth, the Social Se- 
curity records double count self-employed individuals holding a second legal labor 
contract with an employer. Finally, individuals employed in the household service 
sector and working less than 20 hours per week are not oblige to be registered in the 
Social Security records.
Below we assess the contribution of immigration to the discrepancies between the 
employment recorded in the Labor Force Survey, that should include legal and ille- 
gal workers, and that in the Social Security records, that include only legal workers. 
As becomes clear from the previous discussion, we can not interpret the difference 
in employment between the two data sources as solely due to informal employment. 
however, we next argue that our analysis allows us to draw some conclusions on the 
impact of immigration on the size of the informal labor market.
our empirical approach correlates annual changes in the differences between em- 
ployment in the LFS and the SS records and changes in immigration densities across 
provinces between 2000 and 2009. our conjecture is that immigration has increased 
the size of the informal labor market as many immigrants enter the country illega- 
lly and even if they hold a legal status they are illegally hired by employers. our 
strategy will identify the contribution of immigration to the illegal economy under 
the assumption that the methodological discrepancies between the LFS and the SS 
records are constant over time or unrelated to immigration flows.
As already mention the LFS will only capture a lower bound on the size of the 
informal labor market as temporary foreign workers and individuals not living in 
households are not included in the survey. These two type of individuals, particularly 
those in the former group are likely to have increased with the immigration boom of 
the 2000s. Regarding other type of workers that contribute to the differences between 
the LFS and the SS records, we think that it is reasonable to assume that civil servants 
affiliated to a private security system, members of the clergy and self-employed with 
a second contract have remained a constant fraction of the population or that their 
variation are not related to immigration flows. The two type of workers that contribute 
to the differences in employment between our two data sources and which percentage 
in the population may be related to immigration are agriculture workers employed 
on a temporary basis and workers in the household service sector. We investigate the 
robustness of our results by excluding these workers from the analysis.
4. empirical analysis
The core of our analysis employs the differences between the Labor Force Survey 
and Social Security records. We do not claim that those differences are an unbiased 
estimate of the size the informal sector in Spain. What we do claim is that those 
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differences are informative about the evolution of the size of the informal economy 
over time. With this in mind Figures 3 plots those differences at the aggregate coun- 
try level for the period 2000-2009 in absolute and in percentage terms. A few com- 
ments merit attention. First, at the beginning of the decade the LFS showed 400.000 
workers more than the SS records. This corresponds to a 2% out of the approximately 
20 million workers in the Labor Force Survey. Second, these differences tripled (to 
.2 million workers and 6%) during the period 2000 to 2005. After 2005, coinciding 
with the amnesty, the differences stabilized and remained about 6% of total employ- 
ment recorded in the LFS. note that by the end of the period and coinciding with the 
economic downturn this percentage fell to 5%. Figure 4 shows these differences (as 
a percentage of employment in the Labor Force Survey) by nationality. The picture is 
astonishing. Whereas for nationals only around 2% of employment is unregistered, 
for foreigners this ratio is less than 0% at the beginning of the period and reaches 
40% in 2005. Interestingly, the 2005 regularization process halved the share of un- 
registered workers to 20% but in the subsequent years unregistered work increased 
back to 30%.
Figure 4 suggests that the large increase in unregistered work during the first part 
of the decade is tightly linked to the increase in the number of immigrant workers. 
Further evidence of this relationship can be obtained by exploring the regional pat- 
terns of those discrepancies. Figure 5 displays the relationship between the growth in 
the share of foreign born population and the growth in unregistered employment by 
province for the period 2000-2009. There is a clear positive correlation between im- 
migration growth and the share of unregistered work. If we fit a linear regression to 
the data in Figure 5 the estimate on the slope coefficient indicates that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the share of foreigners in the province is associated to a 0.36 per- 
centage points increase in the provincial share of unregistered work, and this effect 
is significant a the 1% level of significance. Below we analyze the robustness of this 
correlation and investigate whether it can receive a causal interpretation.
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4.1. The Empirical Model
To investigate the effect of immigration on the discrepancies between the Labor 
Force Survey and the Social Security records we estimate the following empirical 
model:
 Δrt = α + φr + γt + βimmigrant_sharert + urt []
where Δrt is the difference between the number of employed individuals in the Labor Force Survey and those in the Social Security records in province r and year t. The 
difference is normalized using the number of employed individuals in the Labor For- 
ce Survey in the corresponding cell (r,t). our main explanatory variable is the share 
of immigrants, immigrant_sharert, defined as the percentage of working age foreign born individuals over the total working age population in a given province, r, and 
year, t. notice that equation [] includes year, γt, and province, φr, fixed effects, thus 
identification of our main coefficient of interest, β, comes from comparing changes 
in the differences between the LFS and the SS within provinces and over time, in 
high versus low immigration provinces.
As argued in the previous section the difference between the LFS and the SS 
records do not only respond to undocumented work. however, as long as changes 
in this difference unrelated to irregular activities are constant over time or within 
provinces, or uncorrelated to the stock of immigrants (e.g. the size of the clergy, self- 
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employed workers with a second contract or civil servants with private affiliation), 
the β coefficient in equation [1] will identify the effect of immigration on the size 
of the informal labor market. We think this is a reasonable assumption, particularly 
when we exclude from the analysis workers in the agriculture sector.
We also investigate the effect of the 2005 amnesty on the size of the informal 
labor market. The aim of the regularization process was to legalize the employment 
of the large number of illegal aliens (see Figure 2), and thus decrease the size of the 
shadow economy. To assess the effectiveness of the policy we estimate the following 
empirical model:
Δrt = α + φr + γt + βimmig_sharert + δamnesty0.5 + θimmig_sharert * amnesty0.5 + urt [2]
The amnesty0.5 variable is an indicator that takes value  from 2005 onwards and 0 for the previous years. Thus δ measures the impact of the regularization on the 
size of the informal economy. Finally, the coefficient on the interaction between the 
immigrant share and the amnesty indicator, θ, is informative of any change in the 
relationship between immigration and informality as a result of the regularization 
process.
Identification of the model coefficients in equation [1] and [2] exploits the 
geographical differences in the concentration of immigrations across Spanish 
provinces. As in previous immigration studies, the spatial correlation approach 
adopted here may suffer from endogeneity if the flow of immigrants towards 
particular provinces is not exogenous to the particular economic phenomββena 
we are interested in. In order to circumvent this problem we employ the classical 
instrumental variable approach based on ethnic networks. This approach isolates 
the variation in immigrant concentration across provinces that results from recent 
immigrants locating in provinces with large communities of previous immigrants 
from the same country of origin.
More formally, consider the following predictor for the size of the immigrant 
population in a province r in a given year t:
 Z
r,j
 = ∑
c
 Zc,r,t = ∑
c
 ( FBr,c,t0FBc,t0 ) FBc,t [3]
for t0 < t. The term in brackets denotes the share of the foreign-born population from country of origin c living in Spain’s province r in some base year t0. As discussed below the base year in this analysis is 99. FBc,t is the total size of the population from country c residing in Spain in year t. We obtain the instrument by adding up 
the predicted share of immigrants by country of origin in each province, Zr,t, and normalizing it by the working age population in the cell (r,t).
The instrument based on ethnic networks has been widely used in the US (Card, 
200), but less in countries with a much recent immigration history such as Spain. 
Intuitively, the instrument reassigns the current stock of immigrants across provinces 
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according to the historical settlements of their country men. The immigration process 
to Spain started timidly at the beginning of the 990s, thus we use the geographical 
distribution of immigrants across Spanish provinces in 99 as a base year to 
construct our instrument.
The validity of the ethnic networks instrument based on the 99 historical 
settlements depends on two crucial assumptions. First, the location decisions of 
immigrants prior to 99 across Spanish provinces have to be uncorrelated with 
unexpected changes or transitory shocks to the size of the provincial shadow 
economies between 2000 and 2009. This assumption can not be empirically tested, 
however the geographic dispersion of immigrants by country of origin across 
Spanish provinces suggest that economic reasons cannot be the only determinant of 
immigrant location decisions. For example, Moroccans are overrepresented in the 
Mediterranean coast such as Murcia, Alicante and Girona; while South-Americans 
are popular in the Canary Islands and the north-Western provinces of the country. 
This evidence, at least for Moroccans, suggests that geographical proximity to 
the country of origin is an important determinant of their location decisions. The 
geographical choices of South- Americans may be linked to the presence of Spanish 
returnees from previous emigration episodes, originally from Galicia and the Canary 
Islands.
The second assumption that the instrument requires is that the immigrant 
settlements established before 99 have to be able to predict the location decisions 
of new arrivals from the same country 8 to 8 years latter. This assumption can 
be tested in our first-stage regressions, from where we can assess the predictive 
power of the predicted share of immigrants in explaining the current distribution of 
immigrants across Spanish provinces. We present the first-stage results shortly, but 
first we focus on the oLS estimates of the models in equation [] and [2].
Table  present the estimates of the models in equation [] and [2] respectively. 
The dependent variable in both equations, the difference in employment according 
to the LFS and the SS records normalized by the level of employment in the LFS, is 
measured as an annual average for the period 2000-20090. We use the Population 
Registry to compute the annual share of foreign born population at the provincial 
level. Thus our sample consists of 500 observations (0 years and 50 Spanish 
provinces2). To obtain robust estimates of the variance-covariance matrix we weight 
the observations using the province population at time t.
Column () and (2) in Table  report the oLS estimates of the model in equation 
[1] and [2]. The estimated coefficient on the share of immigrants indicates that a 1 
0 note that the LFS is a quarterly survey, while the information in the SS records is released on a monthly 
basis.
 See FARRé, GonzáLEz and oRTEGA (200) for a discussion on the advantages of using the 
Population Registry in measuring the local concentration of immigrants in Spain.
2 We exclude Ceuta and Melilla from the analysis as the concentration of immigrants in that region was 
already very high at the beginning of the period.
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percentage point increase in the share of the foreign born population in a province 
increases the share of unregistered work by 0.3 percentage points. This relationship 
does not seem to change after the amnesty took place in 2005. our estimates indicate 
that while the amnesty represented a significant reduction in the size of the informal 
sector (i.e. in the average province and for the period 2005 to 2009 the size of the 
informal labor market declined by about .5 percentage points), it did not managed 
to significantly change the relationship between immigration and informality. Thus 
the coefficient on the interaction between the immigrant provincial concentration 
and the amnesty indicator is not statistically significant.
Columns (3) and (4) in the same table report the IV estimates of the model when 
using the ethnic networks instrument. If we first examine the first-stage results 
associated to these regressions and reported in Table 2, we can conclude that our 
instrument, the predicted share of immigrants, is a strong predictor of the current 
provincial distribution of immigrants. A coefficient of 0.289, with a t-statistic of 11.13 
and an associated F-test of 08.04 clearly rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments. 
The 4 estimates in columns (3) and (4) in Table  are larger than the OLS results, 
but the coefficients are somehow estimated with less precisions. However, they 
still support the main conclusion in the OLS estimation. That is, immigration has a 
positive impact on the size of the informal labor market and though the 2005 amnesty 
decreased the size of the informal economy it does not affected the relationship 
between immigration and underground economy at the provincial level.
In interpreting the effects of the 2005 amnesty one should bear in mind that 
the regularization occurred during the largest economic expansion of the Spanish 
economy in decades. While the amnesty managed to legalize many immigrants 
(about 600,000) and thus reduced the size of the black economy, illegal aliens 
continued to enter the country attracted by the many job opportunities available. 
our estimates indicate that the amnesty was indeed unsuccessful in affecting the 
relationship between immigration and the size of the informal labor market.
4.2. Robustness checks
In Table 3 we conduct a series of checks to assess the robustness of our results. 
First, since the agricultural sector may be responsible for part of the inconsistencies 
between the LFS and the Social Security records, we estimate the same regressions 
as in Table  but using data only from the manufacturing and the service sector. 
The results reported in column () and (2) of Table 3 indicate that the relationship 
between immigration and the informal sector are reinforced when the agricultural 
sector is excluded from the sample.
Columns (3) and (4) show the unweighted regressions. The results are qualitatively 
the same as in Table  but quantitatively stronger indicating that the relationship 
between immigration and the informal sector is stronger in provinces with less 
population. Columns (5) and (6) try to control for any labor market characteristics 
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that can spuriously generate the observed relationship between immigration and 
the size of the shadow economy. In particular, one could suspect that provinces 
with particular labor market characteristics or industry structure are more prone to 
both receive more immigrants and have more unregistered work. Using data from 
the LFS in 2000 we calculate the participation rate, unemployment rate, share of 
occupied population in the industry, service and construction sectors. We allow for 
different provinces to have different trends of unregistered employment along those 
dimensions. We do not find any significant differences with previous results.
To close our analysis Table 4 investigates the implications of the economic 
recession inaugurated in the mid-2007. As discussed, one the most dramatic conse- 
quence of the economic downturn has been the increase in the unemployment rate 
(from 8.53% in 2006 to 24.63% in 202). Several studies investigate the relationship 
between the economic cycle and the size of informal labor market. There seems to 
be the consensus that the share of informal employment is countercyclical in most 
developed countries (Loayza and Rigolini, 2007, and Boeri and Gribaldi, 2006), 
however episodes of procyclical behavior have also been identified in some middle 
income countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Mexico (Fiess et al., 2008).
To start the analysis we first replicate the estimations in Table 1 with additional 
data for the period 2010-2012. The first column in Table 4 presents the IV estimates 
of the model in equation [] and the second those of equation [2]. The estima- 
ted coefficients indicate a stronger relationship between immigration and the share 
of the informal economy than when the sample is restricted to the period 2000-
2009. In particular, a  percentage point increase in the share of the foreign born 
population in a province increases the share of unregistered work in that province by 
approximately  percentage point.
To investigate the implications of the economic recession the model in equation 
[] is extended by including an indicator variable that takes value  if the observation 
corresponds to the period 2008-202 and 0 otherwise (i.e. crisis indicator). The model 
also includes an interaction between this indicator and the share of immigrants in the 
province (i.e. crisis × share of immigrants). The IV estimates reported in column 
3 indicate that the relationship between the presence of immigrants and the size of 
the informal economy is slightly higher during the recessionary period. That is, for 
the period 2008-202 a  percentage point increase in the share of the foreign born 
population in a province increases the share of unregistered work by 0.9 percentage 
points, while this increase is only of 0.7 percentage points before the economic 
collapse. Interestingly, the results also indicate that the share of unregistered 
work decreased during the economic downturn. This may result from the large 
concentration of informal workers in the construction sector, who were unable to 
find jobs in alternative sectors after the burst of the real-state bubble. Finally the 
last column in Table 4 includes the crisis and the amnesty indicators as well as their 
interaction with the share of immigrants. Since there is a substantial overlap between 
the periods identified by those indicators, its effects cannot be separately identified.
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table 1
relatIonShIp between Share oF ImmIgrantS and InFormal 
economy
olS olS Iv Iv
Share of Immigrants 0,304**
(0,24)
0,343***
(0,9)
0,78***
(0,28)
0,792***
(0,293)
Amnesty –1,522
(.776)
–7,078***
(2.697)
Amnesty X Share –0,0291
(0.0654)
0.00378
(0.6)
observations 500 500 500 500
R2 0.834 0.834 0.84 0.84
table 2
FIrSt-Stage reSultS
olS olS
Instrument 0.289***
(0.026)
0.348***
(0.052)
Amnesty X Instrument –0.041
(0.453)
observations 500 500
R2 0.927 0.930
F-test 08.04 .27
noTE: The dependent variable in the regressions is the share of immigrants.
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table 3
robuStneSS checkS
no agriculture unweighted province trends
Iv Iv Iv Iv Iv Iv
Share of Immigrants 0.930***
(0.207)
0.865***
(0.300)
.36***
(0.340)
.268***
(0.507)
.05***
(0.358)
.020***
(0.39)
Amnesty –8.673***
(2.529)
–12,91***
(4.306)
4.384
(5.0)
Amnesy X Share 0.0383
(0.8)
0.0388
(0.62)
0.0373
(0.7)
500 500 500 500 500 500
0.827 0.829 0.693 0.700 0.796 0.795
table 4
robuStneSS checkS (tIme perIod 2000-2012)
Iv Iv Iv Iv
Share of Immigrants .083***
(0.78)
.07***
(0.298)
0.698***
(0.96)
.268**
(0.507)
Amnesy –10.91***
(.32)
–1.297
(.28)
Amnesty X Share 0.033
(0.20)
–0.077
(0.22)
Crisis –8.790***
(.97)
–8.067***
(.375)
Crisis X Share 0.85***
(0.0900)
0.73*
(0.097)
650 650 650 650
0.785 0.787 0.786 0.783
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5. conclusions
The economic expansion in developed countries during the last decade has led to 
an extraordinary large inflow of immigrants from less developed economies. Attracted 
by the job magnet and discouraged by the scarcity of legal entry channels, many of 
them have surreptitiously crossed the borders. This large supply of irregular workers 
have boosted the underground economy, particularly in countries where irregular 
economic activities are not unpopular such in Southern European countries.
This paper investigates the relationship between immigration and the size of 
the informal labor market in Spain. our estimates suggests that the 2 percentage 
points increase in the foreign born population between 2000 and 2009 accounted 
for at least a 70% of the overall increase in unreported employment. In an attempt 
to remove illegal aliens from the Spanish labor market, the government granted 
amnesty to about 700,000 workers in 2005. Through this regularization process an 
important fraction of the illegally resident population was legalized and thus the 
share of undocumented employment decreased by at least 2 percentage points. 
however, illegal immigrants continued to arrive attracted by the prosperity of the 
economy, the weak border enforcement and the minimal employer sanctions. hence, 
the relationship between immigration and the size of the shadow economy remained 
unaffected after the amnesty.
With this paper we uncover an important positive relationship between 
immigration and the size of the informal labor market. We also show that amnesties 
are not effective in affecting this relationship, at least if they are implemented during 
periods of high economic growth. Accordingly, guest-worker programs and a stronger 
enforcement of the immigration laws, both at the borders and the work place, seem 
a more effective way to fight illegal alien employment.
Finally we also show that the relationship between immigration and the size of 
the informal economy is slightly modify during recessionary periods.
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